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When Heidegger’s question of technology arrived in French theory 
through the writings of Bernard Stiegler, Jacques Derrida, Dominique 
Janicaud, and Jean-Luc Nancy, the context was over layered by the impact 
of the four volumes of translations into French of Heidegger’s writings, 
under the title Questions. Questions IV arrived in 1976, providing the 
1966–9 versions of the Le Thor seminars given by Heidegger in Provence, 
and the Zaehringen Seminar of 1973. The active participation of one gen- 
eration of French thinkers in these late seminars under the leadership of 
Jean Beaufret is well known. Janicaud, in his study and sequence of inter- 
views, Heidegger in France (2001) develops that narrative, marking the 
emergence of a second generation of French thinkers, including both the 
four named above, and the rather different critical responses to Heidegger 
from Jean-Luc Marion and Jean-Francois Courtine, among others. What 
marks Janicaud and his three companions from these others is their focus 
on Heidegger’s analysis of the arrival of philosophy as metaphysics in the 
form of technically given, auto-telic relations, in which meaning and the 
human dimension has gone missing. They variously study how the sur- 
mised transformation of meaning systems may rather be thought not as a 
single destinal occurrence but as a series of disparate, disseminating desta- 
bilisations and reconfigurations that necessitate, for Stiegler, a rethinking 
of the grammar of time itself, and, for Derrida, an emphasis on multiple, 
self-supplementing and disseminating meaning systems rather than on a 
single unifying system. In place of the stark focus on a rigidly given tech- 
nicity, and a turn away from a history of philosophy as a transmission of 
meaning, the focus moves to instabilities and multiplicities, technicities 
and turning points, in place of a monolithic notion of technology and a 
unitary turn (Kehre). Granted that Heidegger’s own view is that the epoch 
of the turn may last a thousand years, this version of the question of tech- 
nology is not obviously incompatible with the analyses offered by Heide- 
gger. It also has the virtue of more obviously providing a conceptuality 
through which one may begin to make sense of the twenty-first-century 
context of technical installations, now marked by 5G tele-communication 
 
 
systems, the internet of things, social media platforms, and big data. 
 
 
Structure and History: First Set of Forces1 
The proposal here is to set up a parallelogram of forces, formed out of 
two vectors. The first vector emerges from a discussion between Jacques 
Derrida and Bernard Stiegler, connecting the enquiry, begun by Derrida 
in Of Grammatology (1967), and Stiegler’s own retrieval of components 
from the writings of Edmund Husserl, in the analyses proposed in his 
three-volume, and still incomplete study, Stiegler: Technics and Time 
(1994, 1996, 2001). This conversation arrives explicitly in their jointly 
authored text, Echographies of Television: filmed interviews (1996). 
Implicit here is a reading of Derrida’s own commentary on Husserl’s 
essay ‘On the Origin of Geometry’ (1964) and his latterly published, but 
earlier conceived study, The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy 
(1990).2 The forces constituting this vector arise from a return to, and 
release of under-appreciated elements in Husserl’s phenomenological en- 
quiries, concerning time, meaning and origins. Husserl’s essay, ‘On the 
Origin of Geometry’ dates from around the time of the composition  
of Husserl’s The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental 
Philosophy (1939) which, in its title, announces its problem: to assess 
the degree of tension between an ideal of objectivity and universality, in 
the natural sciences, and indeed in the whole programmatics of enlight- 
enment thinking, and their supposedly uniquely European originations. 
Derrida returns to this problematic in the second of the essays published 
in Voyous: Rogue States (2003), which is dedicated to Dominique Jani- 
caud: ‘The “world” of the enlightenment to come (exception, calculation 
and sovereignty).’3 
In Of Grammatology, Derrida puts together a series of texts, loosely 
focused on problems concerning structure and meaning, history, and 
horizonality, which form the context for this discussion. With respect 
to his invocation of an ‘age’ of Rousseau, Derrida writes in the opening 
pages: 
 
Although the word ‘age’ or ‘epoch’ can be given more than these 
determinations, I should mention that I have concerned myself 
with a structural figure as much as an historical totality. I have 
attempted to relate these two seemingly necessary approaches thus 
repeating the question of the text, its historical status, its proper 
time and space. The age already in the past is in fact constituted in 
every respect as a text, in a sense of these words that I shall have 
to establish. As such the age conserves the value of legibility and 
the efficacy of a model and thus disturbs the time (tense) of the line 
and the line of the time (tense). I have tried to suggest this by call- 
ing upon and questioning the declared Rousseauism of a modern 
anthropologist. 
(Derrida: ‘Preface’ Of Grammatology p. xc)4 
 
 
The ‘modern anthropologist’ in question is Claude Levi-Straus, a short 
section of whose Tristes Tropiques (1955) is analysed in a later section of 
Of Grammatology. The ambiguity of the French term ‘temps’ is marked 
up in the prevarication between ‘time’ and ‘tense,’ in the translation. 
There is similarly a prevarication to be marked in the notion of the ‘ligne’ 
which, as well as the meaning of the common-sense notion of a line as 
continuity, comprises also a counterpoint to the notion of the point, in 
the construction of elementary propositions in geometry. The unstated 
and only partially explored dimension here is the presumption that eth- 
nographies of non-European peoples reveal that, where these peoples 
supposedly have ‘myth’ and kinship structures, European peoples have 
developed a notion of history and industrial production, underpinning 
their specificity, and indeed their dubious claims to superiority. 
In these texts, Derrida develops a critique of any notion of history, 
predicated on a realisation of a pre-given, pre-ordained essence, and 
programme for its actualisation. ‘Grammatology’ then would be the 
study of the allure of, and fallibility of, such programming, and pro- 
grammatics. In discussion with Stiegler, a term challenging the status of 
such programming, given in advance of what occurs, arrives in the form 
of the notion of an originary prosthetics. These prosthetics consist in the 
artifice, an adjunct component required as supplement to permit what 
occurs to function. In place of a primordial nature, or phusis, conceived 
as complete in itself, and a secondary system of techne, or artifice, filling 
out and providing adjustments within and to that system, techne as pros- 
thetics is to be recognised as providing a supplementary precondition, 
which necessarily precedes the supposedly naturally given order. This 
then destabilises the supposedly necessary order, first nature and then 
culture, first phusis and then techne. They instead arise as a disjunctive 
simultaneity. 
Prosthetics, in the familiar and more limited sense of the practices of 
sculpting missing limbs, is linked up to a notion of that which precedes 
the formation of a thesis: in the strong sense of that which may mean- 
ingfully be claimed, or stated. For there to be a thesis, there must be  
states of affairs, and access to them; claims about them, and a medium   
in which to articulate those claims. From thinking language and mem- 
ory as artifice and as an originary technicity in Of Grammatology and 
indeed in the two preceding essays on Husserl, Derrida joins Stiegler in 
this view that the notion of an originary prosthetics better captures what  
is in play. The notion is further elaborated by Derrida in his paradoxical 
text, Monolingualism of the Other or the Prosthetics of Origin (1996),    
in which he explores the antinomies: ‘We only ever speak one language’ 
and ‘We never speak only one language.’5 The focus in that text remains 
on the constraints and opportunities provided by language use, but with 
the developments offered by Stiegler, and by Jean-Luc Nancy the domain 
is expanded to that of systems of coding, in general, and to systems 
 
 
of meaning, storage and transmission, more broadly understood. There 
are indications in Of Grammatology that Derrida is already thinking 
through the implications of the contemporary innovations in the life sci- 
ences, associated in France with the names of Georges Canguilhem and 
of Francois Jacob, and in the transatlantic context with those of Watson, 
Crick, and Franklin.6 This suggests a connection to a shift in focus in 
thinking about the sciences, from one on geometry and cosmology, to 
thinking about genetics, DNA coding and the metamorphoses of living 
beings. 
The studies collected in Of Grammatology propose a critique of tele- 
ological understandings of meaning and of history, as necessarily bound 
to suspect notions of completion and fulfilment, of an essence, of hu- 
manity or of freedom, or both, and of some ineluctable providence or 
intention, divine or mundane, which are thereby actualised.7 Derrida 
discusses the movement of supplementarity, and its inscription as trace, 
which, in Of Grammatology, is more in evidence than any discussion of 
the movement called différance. The discussion is framed by this invoca- 
tion of the ‘declared Rousseauism’ of Levi-Strauss and a reading of Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau’s analyses in his Confessions (1770) and elsewhere, of 
this movement of supplementarity, which turns out to precede what it is 
supposed to supplement. Cultural life is construed in relation to, and as 
a supplement to natural givens: but without cultural life, there would be 
no hypothesising about natural givens. Similarly, analyses are proffered 
for education, in relation to, and as a necessary supplement for naturally 
given capacity; and masturbation, or auto-eroticism, is thematised in 
relation to an eroticism directed outwards and, or reciprocally eliciting 
the participation of another. 
The discussion of Rousseau masks Derrida’s on-going reading of the 
writings of Freud. The encounter with Husserl arrives more directly in  
the closing pages of the section ‘From/of the supplement to the source,’ 
where Derrida invokes his previous readings of Husserl, especially of 
Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929). Derrida writes, with reference 
back to Kant’s enquiries: 
 
If the space time that we inhabit is a priori the space-time of the 
trace, there is neither pure activity nor pure passivity. This pair of 
concepts, - and we know that Husserl erased the one with the other 
constantly- belong to the myth of the origin of an uninhabited world, 
of a world alien to the trace: pure presence of the pure present that 
one may either call purity of life or purity of death: determinations 
of thinking which has always superintended not only theological 
and metaphysical but also transcendental questions, whether con- 
ceived in terms of the scholastic theology or in a Kantian and post 
Kantian sense. 





The Husserlian project of a transcendental aesthetics, of restoration 
of the ‘logos of the aesthetic world (Formal and Transcendental 
Logic) remains subjected to the instance of the living present as to 
the universal and absolute form of experience. It is by what compli- 




This is the connection back to Derrida’s previous analyses of Husserl, 
which show how passive syntheses, or auto-affection, are a pre-condition 
for the positive results of active syntheses, in providing stable objects of 
attention, and thereby objects of knowing. These are the beginnings of 
the analysis of an originary prosthetics: the phenomena which present 
themselves for attention acquire shape and meaning only as a result of 
appeal to components, surmised, but not phenomenally present. Thus, 
the phenomenal series of presentations are shown to be held in place by a 
structuring set of conditions of possibility, not themselves phenomenally 
presented. Derrida suggests that Husserl, in the essay, ‘Of the Origin of 
Geometry,’ analyses how systems of formalisation and inscription are 
necessary supplements, to processes of empirical generalisation and sim- 
ple memorisation. Delimiting, storing, and making possible recurrent 
access to previously acquired theoretical insight are analysed, specifi- 
cally with respect to axioms of geometry, and to the scientific discoveries 
of Galileo Galillei. 
 
Excription on the Edge of Phenomenology: 
Second Set of Forces 
The second set of forces arrives from Nancy’s disruptive retrieval of 
Heidegger’s redeployment of distinctions between phusis and techne, 
between theoria and poiesis, between sophia and  praxis.8  Like  Hus-  
serl, Martin Heidegger supposes that philosophy, at  the  beginning  of 
the twentieth century, requires a new beginning. In Being and Time 
(1927), Heidegger appropriates Husserl’s insistence on  this  necessity, 
and proposes to stage that beginning by a return to the Greek origins of 
philosophy, to retrieve from Plato’s dialogue The Sophist, an originary 
and forgotten founding question for philosophy: what is the meaning      
of being? Heidegger proposes to retrieve an alternative transmission of 
founding conceptions of Greek philosophy, to put in question what he 
takes to be a received history of the concept of time. His proposals are, 
however, put radically in doubt by the question whether or not these 
terms and origins can be retrieved into a modern idiom, or whether 
whatever that Greek origin may have been now lies beyond the compass 
 
 
of modern generations of human beings to retrieve. Nancy, Heidegger 
and, indeed, Friedrich Nietzsche pose a series of questions to the viabil- 
ity of an appreciation of these Greek origins, with respect to the overlay 
of Christian doctrine, and theological system. Nancy also puts a focus 
on the obscuring effects on this transmission in the arrival of notions 
appertaining to Roman law. Also in play are the distorting effects of a 
revival and transposition of a conception of Civic Religion, underpin- 
ning national identities in the formation of modern states, by contrast 
to the function of religious practices, and the honouring of ancestors, in 
Greek city states, such as Athens and Sparta. 
By a series of movements, Nancy neutralises the immobilising power of 
these inherited meanings, and, instead of proposing a return to reading 
the Greek texts, in which they arrive for attention, he turns the discus- 
sion of technics into an enquiry about a dynamic, changing, as opposed 
to a static, framing for human existing. By contrast to the emphasis on 
nihilism associated with Nietzsche and Heidegger, Nancy traces out an 
alternative account of an emptying out of determinacy in sense, and in 
meaning relations in the world, neither that of a divine kenosis, nor that 
of an absenting of the divine, from whom an order is supposed to have 
derived. The resulting destabilising of order in the world is to be matched 
by registering a disruption of concepts of world, and of cosmos, universe 
and of the worlding of world, die Weltlichkeit der Welt. This last is 
Heidegger’s term, in which meaning and sense arrive for attention at the 
site, Dasein, determinate existing, as invoked by Heidegger, at which 
questions of meaning and sense arise. Where Nietzsche and Heidegger 
wrestle with the negative implications of a devaluation of all values, re- 
sulting from a weakening of the forces of transmission, and inheritance, 
Nancy seeks in the consequent degree of disorientation and disruption 
an enabling opening of spaces, at the limits of sense (les confins) and 
in constellations of concepts, a notion borrowed from Walter Benjamin 
and T.W. Adorno. In these spaces, meaning may arrive, be generated 
and reconfigured as arriving incomplete and subject to negotiation, as 
opposed to programmed in advance by history, or destiny. Essence, or 
the concept are no longer to be conceived speculatively, as implicitly con- 
taining all possible meaning and meanings. Nancy proposes instead the 
notions of a partage, or distribution, and an excription of sense in par- 
tial, negotiable determinations of meaning at the limit of articulability.9 
In the sections of his The Sense of the World (1993) in which this 
is discussed, Espaces: confins and Espaces: Constellations, Jean-Luc 
Nancy provides the following schematisation: 
Scheme: 
 
Cosmos- myth- given sense 
Heaven and earth- creation – announced/desired sense 
World- spacing- sense as existence and techne. 
 
 
(But worldliness does not merely succeed, it precedes as well. The 
world before humanity and beyond humanity is also our world, and 
we are also toward it.) 
(Nancy: Sense of the World p. 45, French p. 75) 
 
Here ‘world’ occupies the place ascribed in the conversation between 
Stiegler and Derrida to an originary technicity, or prosthetics. In the 
preceding section, Nancy makes reference to moves made by Bernard 
Stiegler, in the first then unpublished volume of Technics and Time: 
 
‘There is a technological différance. Or rather: différance is technolog- 
ical’ - this is the central thesis of Bernard Stiegler in La faute d’Epi- 
methee: La technique et le temps (Paris: Gallimard, forthcoming). This 
thesis, the first no doubt since Simondon (whom Stiegler re-reads) to 
take into account ‘technology’ as a proper mode of ‘beingness’ in gen- 
eral, is thus in solidarity with a thesis on ‘sense as consistency of the 
lack of origin’ which leads to certain remarkable statements: ‘Sense is 
the future of signification’; ‘sense is always, in fact, the fruit of a … 
work or mourning for the self on the threshold of an other self. Sense is 
the contestation of established significations for this future of the other.’ 
(Nancy: Sense of the World p. 179, French pp. 65–66) 
 
The term ‘différance,’ neither a word nor a concept, is here taken up 
as a challenge for thinking, not as some determinate content, or fixed 
operation. The fault of Epimetheus, the brother of the more famous Pro- 
metheus, is to have provided human being with no special skill with 
which to defend and promote itself as a species, no capacity to dig, as 
does the mole, or to run, as does the antelope. The resulting vulnera- 
bility prompts Prometheus to steal fire from the Gods, and to suffer the 
consequent punishment, his liver devoured each day by the eagles sent by 
Jove. Where some construe this as a constitutive lack, Nancy thinks in 
terms of a constitutive finitude and incompleteness. The reference to Gil- 
bert Simondon and to his analyses of the mode of being of technical ob- 
jects is also striking.10 As a consequence of footnotes becoming endnotes 
in the English translation the salience of this remark can go unremarked. 
Nancy’s analyses both develop and challenge Heidegger’s account of 
nihilism. What Nancy shares with Heidegger is a doubt about any con- 
tinuing status of meaning, as providing a privileged and reliable domain 
for the construction of philosophical conceptuality, by contrast to the 
appeals made by respectively Hegel and Husserl to some such conception 
of meaning and sense. Heidegger’s questioning of technology reveals the 
arrival of systems of thingly relations which do not presuppose systems 
of meaning for their mediation and articulation. This Heidegger begins 
to discuss in his lectures on Kant, The Question of the Thing, 1935– 
1936,  and  in  the  essay  ‘The Age  of  the  World  Picture’ (1938),11  both 
 
 
from before the Second World War, but after his endorsement in 1933 of 
Hitler. This account arrives as a curious confirmation of Hegel’s hypoth- 
esis, in The Philosophy of Right (1821), that the function of concepts 
becomes identifiable only when they have ceased to function, as given in 
the memorable phrase: at the flight of Minerva’s owl, at dusk. The status 
of meaning, as presupposed, arrives for attention when it has ceased to 
function as the necessary and efficacious supplement. The devaluation of 
all values announced by Nietzsche, and discussed extensively by Heide- 
gger in the lectures from 1936 onwards, arrives in Nancy’s writings, 
concerning a crisis for the concept of meaning, or sense: 
 
The ‘question of technics’(la ‘question de la technique’) is nothing 
other than the question of sense placed within limits. Technology is 
quite precisely that which is neither theoria nor poiesis: that which 
assigns sense neither as knowledge nor as work (oeuvre). 
(Nancy: Sense of the world (1993) p. 41, French p. 65)12 
 
Where theoria results in the claims of knowing, and poiesis in the compo- 
sition of works, technology sets up systems of application, classification, 
and processing, without any fixed result or goal, purpose or finality. The 
processes are ends in themselves, with an autonomy in modes of replica- 
tion and evolution. The French ‘technique’ translates the German ‘Tech- 
nik,’ whereas in English there is substituted the notion of ‘technology,’ 
which has the function of rendering even more monolithic what might in 
fact be a piecemeal and many layered set of processes. There is here an 
affirmation of a finitude, in place of any infinitisation of meaning and 
sense, constituting a medium in which to explore and articulate history 
and meaning as a complete system and totality. 
All three thinkers, Derrida, Stiegler and Nancy have critical readings of 
Heidegger. What is at issue here is as much the differences between them, 
as the agreement that Heidegger’s enquiries, while philosophically signif- 
icant, are suspect politically. In the highly charged opening to Division 
Two of Being and Time (1927), Heidegger wrestles, I suggest unsuccess- 
fully, with the problem of demonstrating that a complete structure of Das- 
ein has come into view, in the descriptions provided in Division One, such 
that it may provide the fundamental ontology required to make sense of 
the deficiencies of previous enquiry, and thus to permit his retrieval of the 
history of philosophy. Not only does the programme of providing a de- 
scription of Dasein with sufficient determinacy fail, it is also supplemented 
in Division Two by Heidegger with an appeal to the role of a hero in pro- 
viding a vision of the futurity towards which Dasein should direct itself. 
 
The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been- 
the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero- is grounded exis- 
tentially in anticipatory resoluteness (Entschlossenheit); for it is in 
 
 
resoluteness that one first chooses the choice (Wahl) which makes 
one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that 
which can be repeated. 
(Heidegger: Being and Time M and R p. 437, SZ 385) 
 
The prospect of repetitions of choosing fascist outcomes is not to be 
underestimated, for this hero of course is, for Heidegger then embodied 
in Adolf Hitler, the leader hailed by him in the ‘Rectoral Address’ of 
1933.13 The fault of Epimetheus, deemed responsible in Greek myth 
for sending human beings ill-equipped into the world, is thus converted 
into the fault of Heidegger, in exposing the European philosophical 
tradition to a fascist and destructive prosthetic origin. 
In the next section this discussion will proceed in three steps: with 
Heidegger’s invocation of a question of technology, and Derrida’s re- 
sponse to it; and then with sketches first of Stiegler’s rethinking of 
technics as re-inscriptions of memory, and then of Nancy’s thinking of 
technics, as ecotechnics. In ecotechnics, a worlding of a world arrives,   
no longer secured by some phenomenologically given thrownness into, 
and projection of, meanings, as thought by Heidegger, nor yet to the ar- 
ticulations of a transcendental subjectivity, as thematised in descriptions 
of passive and active syntheses by Husserl. For Nancy, what is written 
(écrit) arrives at the limit (excrit) of what is thinkable and experiencable, 
moving out and away from a given domain of stabilised meaning, into  
the exploratory and innovatory mode of what is yet to come. There is a 
link here from notions of meaning and invention as ex-crire, developed  
by Nancy in his readings of Georges Bataille and of Nietzsche, to a no- 
tion of experience as an ex-per-ire. Writing and experience thus arrive    
in orderly form out of limit experiences, out of a circum-navigation of a 
limit, peras, of what can be registered and made sense of, at given points 
in time and history. 
 
Technology in Three Steps 
A first sketch in Heidegger’s lecture ‘The Question of Technology’ (1953) 
arrives in 1949,  under the title Das Ge-stell, the framework, as part of  
the series of Bremen Lectures,14 in which Heidegger controversially lik- 
ened to mechanised agriculture the Nazi persecution of European Jews, 
and their treatment of bodies after death, in the Nazi death camps. This 
quite properly provokes outrage, especially since Heidegger never clar- 
ified his relation to supporting Hitler, as Fuehrer of the German Reich, 
nor yet his membership of the Nazi party. The more recent revelations    
of his endorsements of a kind of anti-Semitism, in  the  Black  Note-  
books (GA94–96),15 his working notebooks, has  not  surprised  those, 
who already had a sense for his abhorrent political allegiances. It has  
been recently anatomised by Jean-Luc Nancy in his text, The Banality 
 
 
of Heidegger (2015), as another version of the banality, which Hannah 
Arendt identified in her rightly famous analysis of evil in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem (1963). There, she records in painful detail Adolf Eichmann’s 
inability to connect his concerns with schedules, round-ups, and trans- 
port of Jews to the camps, to the absolutely inadmissible programmes     
of persecution and genocide. Heidegger suffers the same inability to 
connect his simply ignorant and dangerous notions of Jewishness and 
Judaism, and his ethnically narrow notion of Germanness to the horror   
of the camps. His political commitments and anti-Semitism had been 
matter for public discussion at least since 1953, when Jurgen Habermas 
responds to the publication of Heidegger’s Summer Semester 1935 lec- 
tures, Introduction to Metaphysics (GA 40), with its infamous phrase 
about the ‘inner truth and greatness of the Nazi movement,’ which 
Heidegger astonishingly seems to have added post-war for the purposes 
of clarifying his stance. 
Heidegger identified with the Nazis, and with Hitler, as critics of, 
and as forces ranged against a spread of technology, and a surmised 
resulting abandonment in the modern world of meaning and value. 
This stance contrasts starkly to the more obvious analysis of them as 
subservient to, and actively promoting forms of technology, which 
permit and promote the bleaching out of all meaning from human 
transactions, rendering the human inhuman, both as persecuted and 
as persecutor. Derrida, Stiegler, and Nancy are acutely aware of, and 
critique Heidegger’s political alignments and affiliations, on more than 
one occasion, both collectively and severally. Derrida in his study Of 
Spirit: Heidegger and the Question (1987) analyses the twisting to- 
gether of four threads in Heidegger’s analyses from the thirties: the 
mode of questioning, the theme of technology, a lack of thinking about 
animality, and: 
 
The fourth thread finally leads through the thinking of epochality     
in itself and in the way it is put to work into what I shall call a little 
provocatively the hidden teleology or the narrative order. 
(Derrida: Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question p. 12) 
 
‘The age of the world picture,’ invoked by Heidegger in 1938, can be 
shown to transmute into the surmised Er-eignis of a withdrawal of be- 
ing, and an arrival of Heidegger’s affirmation, never fully renounced, of  
a certain Nazism. Derrida proposes this nexus of concerns in order to in- 
terrogate the conjugation of Heidegger’s invocations of a notion of spirit, 
doubly inscribed in Christian doctrine and in Hegel’s phenomenology, 
which is more usually avoided by Heidegger, and, controversially, the 
flames of the fire, in which divinity is announced and departs, in both   
the Bible and the Gospels, and in which the Nazis attempted to conceal  




The pure concept, and essence is contaminated by its implication in a 
technique of questioning and a technical apparatus of elaboration and 
articulation: 
 
Contamination then of the thought of essence by technology and so 
contamination by technology of the thinkable essence of technology- 
and even of a question of technology by technology, the privilege of 
the question having some relation already, always with this irreduc- 
ibility of technology. 
(Derrida: Of Spirit p. 10) 
 
From a focus on the Greek notion of techne, as skill and artifice, acquired 
in addition to, and as supplement to natural endowments, the move is to 
some hybrid construction, in part retrieving the Greek conception, but 
more significantly affirming a transition from industrial capital and con- 
ceptions of production, as developing out of long standing processes of 
craft and subsistence agriculture, to information and bio-technologies, 
which radically transform such practices. The term ‘production’ con- 
tinues the logic of innovations arriving out of a fixed given set of rela- 
tions, as opposed to a configuration where there is no longer a pre-given 
natural order to which artifice and techniques of management and co- 
ordination, breeding, and husbandry are an addition; instead that order    
is always already artificial and technically construed. The model is that  
of the land as regularly reconfigured and to be redistributed by the reg- 
ular inundations of a river in flood, as opposed to a landmass with no 
internal dynamic and system of alteration. It is a globe in flux as a result 
of the movement of tectonic plates as opposed to a fixed universe of im- 
perial and Roman order. 
In the Introduction to volume three of his enquiry, Technics and Time, 
Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise (2001),  Stiegler identifies  
a shift in the focus of his analysis, from supposing that there are epochal 
shifts to be analysed, with a transition for one system of technics to 
another. In the previous volumes he had sought to tie a notion of becom- 
ing technical into the opening up of a ‘new unity of space and time,’ ‘a 
new psychic and collective individuation,’ opening up a future horizon 
within which to make sense of unprecedented innovations in human ac- 
tivity. He arrives in this third volume at the view that this becoming no 
longer produces such a future horizon, and that this is to be regretted.    
By contrast, Nancy explores a notion of futurity as that which is neces- 
sarily already open in the indeterminacies of a current configuration of 
codes and inheritances, which because hybrid and in conflict with one 
another, must resist any such horizonal unification. Both attempts  to 
think futurity may be seen as responses to Heidegger’s thinking of time 
and technology, specifically Heidegger’s attempt to think futurity as the 
primary dimension of time, and to Derrida’s insistence on broadening   
the scope of what are taken to be writings with philosophical salience. 
 
 
In his Introduction to that third volume, Stiegler cites himself, from 
Technics and Time volume one, and then puts in question his own 
analysis: 
 
The first ‘moment’ of such epochality is that of a process that could 
be characterized as becoming technical; the second is that of the 
transformation of this becoming into a future. 
Today, the conditions of the second re-doubling are not integrated. 
The re-doubled double has no place. Becoming, which has  been 
disrupted, does not produce a future. 
(Stiegler: Technics and Time 3 p. 7) 
 
The notion of an epoch then is in common between Derrida and Stiegler, 
but it is to be thought not in the Hegelian terms of a necessary sequence 
of such epochs, one following the other and culminating in an actu- 
alisation of freedom, as a basic insight specific to Greek culture. It is 
rather to be thought in terms of the framing or horizon which delimits 
what can be thought in a given context, granted the grounding princi- 
ples and meanings, rendering that epoch distinct from its predecessors. 
This then is to be thought rather in terms of the Husserlian epoche, the 
bracketing of presuppositions concerning what there is, in order to bet- 
ter establish how it comes to be constituted as it is. Both the Husserlian 
and the Hegelian moves are for Nancy unhelpful ways of thinking such 
constraints, since they implicitly and explicitly suppose a single coher- 
ent structure in which everything might be articulable, as opposed to 
adequately recognising conflicting strands within one context, and the 
function of blind spots, of inarticulable secrets held as a cryptic interior 
of what presents itself phenomenally for inspection. Heidegger analyses 
this in terms of the Geheim (as in the Geheimstaatspolizei, more usually 
known as the Gestapo), the secret and concealed nature of a sense of 
home and belonging; Freud, in terms of the Unheimlichkeit, the un- 
canny arrival of familiar, but suppressed and repressed memories, which 
then interrupts, and imposes recurrent impasses in living. Benjamin in- 
troduces a notion of a contraband of history, which is smuggled across 
the border from one epoch to another. For the marginal, marginalised 
figure in history inheritance is always of what has been repressed in pre- 
vious epochs. For Derrida, the figure of the Portuguese Marrano, who, 
after the forcible conversion, or expulsion of the Jews, no longer knew 
exactly in what this Jewish identity consists, is the emblematic figure for 
such a thinking. 
For Nancy, there is here also an unhelpful adoption of a notion of 
becoming, and an overly rigid notion of the future, as a horizon, as op- 
posed to a notion of futurity, as potentialities, already in play. The use of 
the term ‘moment’ perhaps indicates an excessive reliance on a now no 
longer sufficiently pliable set of Hegelian concepts, for which the whole 
 
 
consists of a system of moments in process of self-organisation. Stiegler’s 
account is inflected by his increasing focus on what he calls the hyper- 
industrialisation of temporal objects, and a loss of stability in individu- 
ation, especially of human identities. Time ceases to be a dimension of 
experience, constituted independently of what there is in the world, and 
the movement of processes of industrialisation is analysed as producing 
entities, and the form of entities, as commodities. Human lives become 
functions of the exchange value of their labour-power, both productive 
and reproductive. These processes of industrialisation and the resulting 
destabilisations of identities play a constitutive role in forging the sense, 
directionality, and constitution of time itself.16 In the previous volumes, 
Stiegler had invoked Husserl’s account of memory to provide a new ver- 
sion of how to think the movement from past to future, in place of the 
dogmatically thought Hegelian concept of history as the self-actualising 
idea. Husserl distinguishes from 1904–5 onwards  between  the  pri-  
mary memory of continuous attention to a meaning content, or state of 
affairs, as opposed to the work of a  secondary  memory  of  recollec- 
tion, retrieving previously encountered meaning content, into a present 
context, as Vergegenwaertigung. Stiegler ingeniously invents a third, a 
tertiary memory of shared cultural installations and institutions, and 
practices, as providing the components of shared meanings, registered 
both individually and collectively, through which individuals find them- 
selves interpellated as bearers of meaning from which they might prefer 
to disassociate themselves. 
Stiegler comes increasingly to the view that far from stabilising iden- 
tities, the effect of this tertiary level is to further fragmentation; that   
it generates conflictual strands of meaning and identity, as opposed to 
providing a coherent, organising horizon through which human soci- 
eties may give themselves a sense of collective meaning and purpose. 
Stiegler develops Derrida’s notion of the supplement as pharmakon, the 
cure which may also endanger life, into an analysis of contemporary 
society as systemically pharmacological, addicted to various disenabling 
substitutes and palliatives for an increasingly stressful, dysfunctional 
modes of life. Again here, where Stiegler identifies a deficit, or default, 
Nancy identifies a potentiality and positivity, while not underestimating 
the degree of stress and danger, in an underdetermined opening. They 
both take up some distance from Heidegger’s appropriation of Hölder- 
lin’s observations, that rivers may flow backwards, thus giving access 
to a source, and that where there is danger, there also grows a healing 
power. Adorno is more coruscating on the inadequacies of Heidegger’s 
reading of Hölderlin, who, as the poet of a German resurgence after the 
Napoleonic occupation, might be thought to lack contemporary actual- 
ity. Where Heidegger repeatedly and, it has to be said, ploddingly reads 
Hölderlin, Adorno and Derrida are rather more struck by the poetic 
insights of Paul Celan. 
 
 
Stiegler deploys Husserl’s account of memory, and Derrida’s account 
of an originary technicity, in systems of record and  writing,  which, 
while presented in Of Grammatology (1967) remains to be developed. 
Where Derrida responds to Heidegger on technology in company with 
Rousseau and Freud, on the logics of eroticisation and the techniques 
of psycho-analytical innovation, Stiegler circumvents the  appearance 
that Heidegger’s account of time and technology is complete in itself, by 
demonstrating the potential in this redeployment of elements from Hus- 
serl’s more cautious, and always provisional and incomplete analyses of 
time and memory, of passive and active synthesis. The joint work of 
Stiegler and Derrida, to which the joint publication of Echographies of 
Television bears witness, is an indication of how adopting a form of dia- 
logue in presenting results obviates the impression that the one authority 
can speak and innovate for all. This insistence on the collective nature 
of all intellectual work, even when or perhaps especially when only one 
signature appears at the end of a publication is insisted on by Edmund 
Husserl and put again into focus in Jean-Luc Nancy’s reading of the 
second moment in Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein: Mitsein (being-with). 
Nancy’s preoccupation with Dasein (being-there) as Mit-sein is well 
enough known, but the  implications  of  this  interruption  of  the  drive 
in Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein towards the third moment, as being 
towards, Zu-sein, and, specifically as being towards death, are insuffi- 
ciently appreciated. As in-the-world, Dasein is introduced by Heidegger 
as In-sein, ‘being-in,’ but this being-in is then differentiated as invested 
in a questioning of a differential status of entities in the world, and a re- 
latedness to its context, not as simple extension in space, as matches in a 
match box. Matches in a matchbox, in turn, are to be conceived both as 
simply occupying space and present at hand, designed to fulfil the human 
purposes of lighting fires and providing heat and light. Generating a con- 
ceptual space, a Lichtung, affirmed in Enstschlossenheit, resolution, and 
articulated as Rede, at which what there is can present itself, as it really 
is, then becomes the task for the analytics of Being and Time, hence the 
pathos when, in the ‘Letter on Humanism’ (1946), these clearings turn 
out to be chance openings in a thick forest, without order and direction. 
The Black Forest is not a pre-historical Ur-wald, but is populated by 
trees endangered by acid rain, and perhaps by deserters, taking refuge 
from the fallout of previous historical undertakings and disasters. 
Heidegger recognises that instances of Dasein encounter one another, 
in a mode of Mitdasein, if and when those instances accept and affirm 
those other instances as also the site for a negotiation of meaning. Anal- 
yses in sections 25–27 show how Dasein as Mitsein overlooks, or takes 
for granted that the boat by the lake is the neighbour’s boat; as Mitsein, 
it functions within, but fails to examine how collective meanings are 
inherited and shared, or disavowed, and constitute conflicts. A failure to 
consider how it may be necessary to detach oneself from the collective 
 
 
prejudices of one’s family and neighbours, especially in the case that 
they turn persecutory and anti-Semitic, is one of the gaping voids, in 
Division One, of Being and Time, to which Heidegger’s subsequent Nazi 
enthusiasm bears hideous witness. Jean-Luc Nancy is alert to the brevity 
and inadequacy of Heidegger’s account of Mitsein, even with respect to 
Heidegger’s own aims of distinguishing between a revival, and an immo- 
bilising of the Western philosophical tradition. Heidegger’s willingness 
to listen to Japanese visitors, but not to the distinct modes of German- 
ness, as inherited by German Jews, would be laughable were it not so 
serious in consequence. Nancy seeks to pause the account of Dasein as 
staged in Being and Time at that point, and already in 1980 opens up 
an account, which he develops with Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, of the 
distinctive nature of Nazi myth, to which Heidegger succumbs. 
Derrida complicates Heidegger’s account of technology by noting a 
technics, in systems of registration, in operation before any arrival of a 
notion of a natural order of things. The role of textuality, and the status 
of text, ‘in a sense of these words that I shall have to establish,’ provides 
the site, as an alternate to Dasein, at which meaning may be supposed    
to arrive; and at which nature and culture, phusis and techne, what is 
supposed to grow of its own accord, and what is designed to enhance     
or impede it, emerge as distinct one from the other. Stiegler motivates a 
pluralisation and multiplication of notions of technicity, as many as there 
are systems of memorising and memorialisation, in the activation of 
forms of tertiary memory, alongside continuous remembering and a rec- 
ollecting which overcomes a break between presentation and past event. 
The one is the more concerned with the possibility of meaning, and the 
other with the possibility of continuity. Nancy is plainly sympathetic to 
both of these moves, the exploration of the textual nature of technolog- 
ically articulated accounts of sites at which meaning arrives, that which 
Heidegger calls Dasein, and with the multiplication of technicities, in 
place of the monolith ‘technology.’ His notion of ecotechnics, at least as 
introduced in the 1991 essay, ‘War, Right, Sovereignty-Techne,’ joins this 
up to a problem with both sovereignty and presumptions concerning a 
founding role for meaning in making sense of what there is in the world. 
Nancy writes: 
 
War is nowhere and everywhere, related to any end without any 
longer being related to itself as supreme end. In a sense, then, eco- 
technics is also pure techne, the pure  techne  of  non-sovereignty: 
but because the empty place of sovereignty remains occupied, en- 
cumbered by this very void, ecotechnics does not attain to another 
thinking of the end (goal) without end (completion). By way of the 
administration and control of ‘competition’ ecotechnics substitutes 
crushing blows for sovereignty. 
(Nancy: Being Singular Plural p. 135) 
 
 
The notion of a pure techne of sovereignty indicates the emptying out 
of any function for assigning meaning to the components in circulation, 
constituting this configuration. Nancy then continues: 
 
From now on, then, ecotechnics is the name for ‘political economy’ 
because according to our thinking, if there is no sovereignty, then 
there can be no politics. There is no longer any polis since the oikos  
is everywhere: the housekeeping of the world as a single household, 
with ‘humanity’ for a mother, ‘law’ for a father. 
(BSP, p. 135) 
 
In the extended analysis which follows Nancy attempts to render the 
notion of ecotechnics more precise in the following way: ‘Ecotechnics 
damages, weakens and upsets the functioning of sovereignties except 
for those that in reality coincide with ecotechnical power’ (p. 136). This 
powerful combination of themes plainly requires further analysis, at 
much greater length than available in the closing section of this essay. 
There is also a delicate balance to be struck between this diagnosis of 
a emptying out of meaning, and a hypertrophy of meaning imposed in 
interpretive overload. 
The analysis permits Nancy to bring together responses to Derrida    
and to Stiegler, with these criticisms of Heidegger’s notion of Dasein,   
the questioning of technology and the attention to the inadmissible po- 
litical allegiance of Heidegger’s life choices. Concerns raised by the ev- 
idence of a despoliation and degradation of the ecosphere, the plastic   
bag perhaps even more ill augured than the atomic bomb, are linked to     
a failure of any politics based on concepts of sovereignty to provide the 
means and the conceptuality to analyse what is at stake. The intent of   
this paper is to indicate that how conjoined readings of Heidegger, and   
of texts of Freud and Rousseau, permits Derrida to develop his account  
of meaning and textuality, as a development of, and critique of Heide- 
gger on technology, and then to show how Stiegler and Nancy go to  
work both within, and on the edge of this innovation. As is well enough 
known, Derrida became uneasy about Nancy’s innovations, already in 
comments concerning the use of the terms, fraternity and generosity in 
Nancy’s The Experience of Freedom (1988), and subjected them to fur- 
ther critique in his text, On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy (2000). Nancy,   
at first perhaps somewhat disconcerted by the critique, has since then 
good humouredly observed that while Derrida may be concerned with 
Heidegger’s neglect of the animal, in the account of meaning and the 
planetary spread of nihilism, he, Nancy, is concerned with attending to 
the destiny of the stone, presumed by Heidegger to lack worldly mean- 
ing. He proposes to attend to the destiny of rocks, indeed perhaps of the 
geology which bends and shapes the surface of the planet, on which all  
of these moves are in play. 
 
 
A full account of Nancy on ecotechnics would provide a context for 
making sense of the otherwise baffling claim made in the supplementary 
section of Nancy’s Experience of Freedom (1988): 
 
In this sense, the stone is free. Which means that there is in  the 
stone- or rather, as it is – this freedom of being that being is, in  
which freedom as a ‘fact of reason’ is what is put at stake according 
to co-belonging. 
(Nancy: Experience of Freedom p. 159) 
 
Thus Nancy’s chosen companion, preventing the terms of Heidegger’s 
enquiry from taking over, closing down thinking in favour of choosing 
a hero, where Derrida picks Freud, and Stiegler Husserl, is, of course, 
Immanuel Kant, as shown here by this reference to Kant’s account of 
freedom, as ‘a fact of reason’ in his Critique of Pure Practical Reason 
(1788).17 Nancy then continues: 
 
And this could not be without consequences for the question of 
technology (and on the at once open and aporetic position of this 
question in Heidegger). Not that we have to protect nature against 
technical exploitation (when something of this sort has to be done, 
it is always once again a matter of technology); but in technology we 
liberate, and we liberate ourselves to the freedom of the world. It is 
no surprise that this can cause anguish and profound ambivalence. 
(EF p. 160) 
 
This essay is the beginning of the attempt to make sense of these three 
moves, in the challenge to Heidegger, thinking textuality, multiplying 
technicities, and attributing a certain kind of freedom to stones, to 
rocks, to geology. Heidegger’s attention to a contrast between phusis 
and techne, for the Greeks and, in particular, for Aristotle, and its re- 
turn in the break between Dasein, and inert matter, is treated by all 
three with respect, but it may also be inseparable from his enthusiasm 
for the Nazi cause, an enthusiasm roundly deplored by Derrida, Stiegler, 
and Nancy. As a result of this discussion, some connections between a 
supposed but delusory neutrality of questioning, a failure to think the 
hazards of Mitsein, as an unquestioned belonging together, and a sus- 
ceptibility to repulsive political allegiance, may have come into view. 
This discussion may then provisionally conclude with a further citation 
from Nancy’s 1991 essay, ‘War, Right, Sovereignty – Techne,’ where the 
transition from questioning or thinking technology, to tracing an emer- 
gent notion of ecotechnics once again comes into focus: 
 
What is called ‘technology,’ or again what I have called ecotech-  
nics (in itself which would be liberated from capital) is the techne of 
 
 
finitude or spacing. This is no longer the technical means to an End, 
but techne itself in its in-finite end, techne as the existence of finite 
existence in all its brilliance and violence. It is ‘technology’ itself, but 
it is a technology that, of itself, raises the necessity of appropriating 
its meaning against the appropriative logic of capital and against the 
sovereign logic of war. 
(Nancy: Being Singular Plural p. 140) 
 
This then would provide a focus for a longer, detailed reading of the 
writings of Nancy.18 
This notion of ecotechnics is Nancy’s unique contribution to the task  
of providing a critical response to Heidegger’s insistence, that, in the 
modern epoch, technology no longer lies at the behest of human beings 
but rather frames the context in which human beings experience what      
it means to be human. Ecotechnics thus is to take its place alongside 
Stiegler’s emphasis on an originary technicity and Derrida’s serial inno- 
vations, grammatology, and supplementarity, dissemination, and destin- 
errance, as devices through which to think about stretching, distorting  
and transformatory effects on meaning relations, and on the relations of 
human beings to themselves, and to their surrounds, in the current con- 
text of fifth-generation tele-communications. The reconstruction pro- 
vided in this paper of the lines of discussion in play between these three 
discussants thus contributes to an account of the significance of Nancy’s 
contribution, which may otherwise be overlooked. The proposal would  
be to complicate the reception of Derrida, Stiegler, and Nancy, in the 
English-speaking world, by reading them as jointly inheriting a ques-  
tion posed to philosophy, by Heidegger, made all the more pressing in 
France, in a context informed by the legacy of Nazi Occupation, and     
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